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GUEST STATUTE
THE GUEST STATUS IN AUTOMOBILE CASES
The plaintiff was injured by the negligent driving of the defendant
while returning from a fishing trip in the latter's car. The plaintiff had
bought the gasoline for this particular trip in accordance with the custom
followed by the parties whereby the recipient of the transportation fur-
nished the fuel. The plaintiff denied all contemplation of any contrac-
tual relationship whatsoever.
The Court of Appeals, in affirming the judgment of the Common
Pleas Court, held that the plaintiff was a guest within Ohio G. C. sec.
6308-6 which provides that no person may recover in an action brought
against an auto driver for injuries sustained "while being transported
without compensation therefor in the absence of wilful or wanton
misconduct, and that consequently he could not maintain this action as
there was not sufficient payment to take the case out of the operation
of the statute. Ernest v. Bellville, 53 Ohio App. I 10, 4 N.E. (2nd)
286 (1936).
The word "guest," in the automobile cases, has reference to a rela-
tionship connected with entertainment and hospitality, whereas "pas-
senger" ordinarily involves a carriage for hire, and a resulting contrac-
tual element. Fundamental considerations in every such case . are the
amount of benefit bestowed on the driver and the circumstances attend-
ant thereon.
If the carriage tends to promote a substantial mutual interest of
each party, then, by the weight of authority, the case is taken out of the
guest statute. Latham v. Hankey, I 17 Conn. 5, 166 At. 400 (1933);
Hart v. Hogan, 173 Wash. 598, 24 Pac. (2nd) 99 (1933). If the
only benefits conferred are those incidental to companionship, there is
no such mutual interest. Shiels v. dudette, Ii9 Conn. 75, 174 Ad.
323, 94 A.L.R. 12o6 (1934); Phillips v. Briggs, 215 Iowa 261, 245
N.W. 720 (1932). Nor is the mere fact that the driver receives some
collateral benefit from the carriage sufficient. Leete v. Griswold Post
No. 79, A4merican Legion, 114 Conn. 400, x58 Ad. 919 (1932);
Brothers v. Berg, 214 Wis. 261, 254 N.W. 384 "(934). By way of
illustration, a guest was denied recovery for injuries sustained in the
course of a ride in a case where he accompanied the defendant only
after considerable inducement on her part. Snyder v. Milligan, 53 Ohio
App. 185, 4 N.E.-(2nd) 399 (936). Under facts somewhat more
favorable to the plaintiff the guest was also denied relief when she was
a car-occupant mainly for the purpose of serving as a guide to the driver.
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Master v. Horowitz , 261 N.Y.S. 722, 237 App. Div. 237 (932).
But where the guest was invited by a defendant learning to drive
because she had a driver's license, the court found the necessary mutual
benefit present and allowed recovery. Simons v. Towne, 285 Mass. 96,
i88 N.E. 605 (1934).
New Jersey, which has no guest statute, looks to the origin of the ride
as a test for the rider's status. Thus he is held a guest when the invita-
tion is requested, but a passenger when it is voluntary. Paiewonsky v.
Jaffe, ioi N.J.L. 521, 129 Ad. 142 (1925). The practical effect of
this view is to restrict the rule to the "hitch-hiker" cases. Under statute
law generally the term has been much more broadly construed.
It has been said that if there is a common purpose in the journey,
together with a contract by which gasoline is furnished in return for the
transportation provided, then the arrangement itself affords the rider a
basis for recovery. Beer v. Beer, 52 Ohio App. 276, 3 N.E. (2nd) 645
(1935). The case finds a possible explanation on the basis of a carriage
for hire. Where such a carriage is found, statutes rather uniformly
refuse to classify the party as a guest. The courts, however, are far
from uniform in their interpretations of them, and a plaintiff is some-
times allowed recovery under a statute using the word "hire," while
another plaintiff, on similar facts, is denied relief under a statute contain-
ing the word "compensation," a much broader term. Davis v. Fried-
erichs, 9 La. App. 394, 120 So. 494 (1928); Bookhart v. Greenlease
Motors, 215 Iowa 8, 244 N.W. 721, 82 A.L.R. 1359 (1932); Craw-
ford v. Foster, i1o Cal. App. 21, 293 Pac. 841 (1930). An Ohio
court has declared that compensation sufficient to take the case out of
the statute may be made by consideration taking other forms than
money. Hallgren v. Wilson, i8 Ohio Abs. 652 (1935); but that
something substantial in the way of consideration was intended is shown
by the attitude of the court in Casper v. Higgins, 54 Ohio App. 21
(1937). Here recovery was denied to a college student riding with an
instructor who received part of his salary and expenses from a fund to
which the boy had contributed several dollars. On the other hand, the
host does receive such substantial consideration in the case of the dem-
onstration ride provided for car buyers that the carriage is usually classi-
fied as one for hire. Crawford v. Foster, supra; Bookhart v. Greenlease
Motors, supra.
That a mere gratuitous furnishing of gasoline is not enough to con-
stitute hire is not seriously disputed. Courts look rather closely to the
benefit conferred on the driver and, unless it is substantially equivalent
to that received in return by the rider, they are reluctant to sustain a
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case made out on the basis of mere negligence. It is quite unlikely that
the rider could secure the same amount of transportation from a rail-
road, taxi, or bus company for the price represented by the gasoline
purchase. Furthermore, it is doubtful, from a practical standpoint, that
the purchase was intended as payment, and even if it were, it is even
more doubtful that it was accepted as such. Both tender and acceptance
are necessary for payment. Haas v. Bates, 15o Ore 592, 47 Pac. (2nd)
243 (1935)- On this view of the situation there is substantial justifica-
tion for the position taken in the principal case on the facts before the
court.
A closer question is presented when a purchase of this kind is
intended and received as payment. An Ohio Appellate Court has held
that this constitutes sufficient consideration to take the case out of the
statute. Beer v. Beer, supra. Yet in spite of the fact that a contract has
been entered into, the act of the driver is influenced more by a spirit of
hospitality than a desire for gain, and it would not be surprising if other
courts in such a situation would treat the rider as a guest rather than a
passenger for hire. ROBIN W. LE'rT
LABOR LAW
THE STATUS OF THE STRIKE FOR A CLOSED SHOP.,
A majority of plaintiff's driver salesmen, members of a Drivers'
Union Local, after unsuccessfully requesting their employer to hire only
union labor, went out on strike. The sole issue involved was the right
to strike for a dosed shop. Plaintiff asked the court for a permanent
injunction against the strikers. Defendant conceded that all intimida-
tion and violence should be enjoined but contended that the injunction
should not extend to peaceful picketing.
Held, that all striking activities including peaceful picketing should
be permanently enjoined. Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Bowles et al., 31
Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 425 (Ohio L. Rep. March 12, 1934).
* The following note was previously published in the Ohio Bar for May 7, 1934.
A recheck by Jack Day indicates that the Ohio courts have not since that date passed upon
this subject matter. While the invalidation of the N.I.R.A. has disposed of the principal
case discussed in the note, the issue has taken on a new timeliness in inter-state industry
in view of the similar wording in Sec. 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C.
157) and the added provision in the same act expressly recognizing a closed shop agree-
ment with labor organizations "not established, maintained, or assisted by any unfair
labor practice." (29 U.S.C. 158(3)). Furthermore, the failure of passage in the recent
Ohio Legislature of Am. H.B. 16, restricting jurisdiction for the issuance of injunctions
in labor disputes, has left the question of the right to enjoin a strike for a closed shop in
intra-state industry just as it was when this note was originally written Ed.
